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ARGUMENT
L

THE RULE REQUIRING MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE IS NOT
DISPOSITIVE OF THIS APPEAL
Appellee devotes a considerable portion of her appellate brief to emphasizing Appellant's

claimed failure to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's rulings. Clearly, Appellee has
misconstrued and misunderstood Appellant's arguments. The marshaling rule requires appellants
to marshal the evidence in support of a court'sfindings,then demonstrate that despite this
evidence the court'sfindingsare erroneous and against the weight of the evidence. See State in
the Interest of ST.. 928 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah App. 1996); Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199
(Utah 1991). However, the duty to marshal the evidence arises only where the appellant
challenges the trial court'sfindingsof fact. See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d at 199. Where the
factualfindingsof the lower court are not challenged, the appellate court reviews the trial court's
conclusions of law and the application of the law to the facts of the case. See Saunders v. Sharp.
806 P.2d at 199-200.
In the present case, appellee mistakenly argues that appellant has failed to marshal the
evidence supporting certainfindingsof fact, when actually appellant has not directly challenged
thefindingsof fact. First, appellee attempts to assert the marshaling rule regarding afindingthe
court never made. Appellee states that the court specifically found appellant's relationship with
the children had materially changed. Review of the court'sfindingsdoes not support appellee's
assertion; the court did not make such a finding. Rather, the court found that the co-parenting
4

relationship had deteriorated.
Appellee also asserts the marshaling rule with regard to the court's finding that the joint
parenting relationship had broken down. However, appellant does not challenge this finding, and
thus the marshaling rule is irrelevant. Appellee again turns to the marshaling rule with regard to
the court's finding that vesting custody of the children with appellee is in the children's best
interests. Appellant does not challenge this factual finding, but rather advances the legal argument
that the court should not have reached the best interests analysis. Accordingly, the marshaling
rule is inapplicable and is not dispositive of the issues raised in this appeal.

II.

UTAH CODE SECTION 30-3-10.4(2) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE

Utah Code Section 30-3-10.4 provides, in pertinent part:

"(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may, after a
hearing, modify an order that established joint legal custody if:
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have materially and
substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified, or the order has
become unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances; and
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be an
improvement for and in the best interest of the child.
"(2) The order of joint legal custody shall be terminated by order of the court if both
parents file a motion for termination. At the time of entry of an order terminating joint
legal custody, the court shall enter an order of sole legal custody under Section 30-3-10.
All related issues, including visitation and child support, shall also be determined and
ordered by the court."
5

Appellee incorrectly relies on subsection (2), which requires the order ofjoint legal
custody to be terminated by order of the court "if both parentsfilea motion for termination." In
the present case, however, appellant did notfilea motion for termination of the joint custody
arrangement. Although appellant sought sole custody of the children, he did so in the course of
the litigation, and only in direct response to appellee's petition for an award of sole custody.
Appellee raised the custody issue and brought it before the court, and appellant was forced to
respond.
Appellee construes U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(2) to apply and mandate termination ofjoint
custody when both joint legal custodians seek sole custody in the course of litigation. Appellee's
construction of subsection (2) is incorrect, because it renders language in subsection (1)
meaningless. Subsection (1) applies when "one or both of the joint legal custodians" seek to
change a joint custody order on the grounds that it has become unworkable or a material and
substantial change of circumstances has occurred. If appellee's construction of the statute were
correct, anytime "both joint legal custodians" sought a change in custody arrangements under
subsection (1), the court would be forced to terminate the joint legal custody without considering
whether joint custody had become unworkable or whether a material and significant change in
circumstances had occurred. In other words, in certain situations appellee's construction of
subsection (2) would force courts to bypass subsection (1), thus rendering that part of the statute
meaningless.
In determining the meaning of statutory provisions, the court "must attempt to give each
part of the provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all its terms." In
6

re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). If uncertainty exists as to the meaning or
application of a statute's provisions, the court should "analyze the act in its entirety and
harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose." Id Further,
"'statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful, and ... interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision
nonsensical or absurd.' Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934. 936 (Utah 1980V Perrine v.
Kennecott Min. Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290. 1292 (Utah 1996V
A more reasonable construction of subsection (2) is that it applies where both joint legal
custodians act together to affirmatively seek termination of joint custody. Subsection (2) should
not apply where one joint legal custodian unilaterally seeks to end the joint custody arrangement
by commencing litigation and forcing the other joint legal custodian to respond. The legislature
clearly intended subsection (1) to govern such a situation, and intended the courts to inquire as to
a material and substantial change of circumstances or the workability of continued joint custody.
These elements are in place in subsection (1) specifically to prevent one joint legal custodian from
unilaterally destroying the joint legal custody.
In the present case, appellant's actions should not be construed as a motion for
termination ofjoint custody under U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(2). Rather, this case should fall under
subsection (1), which applies to a motion of "one or both of the joint legal custodians" seeking
modification of a joint custody order. Accordingly, contrary to appellee's contention, subsection
(2) does not apply to the case at bar. The trial court correctly proceeded under subsection (1) and
inquired into whether a material and substantial change of circumstances had occurred.

7

HI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE SECTION 303-10.4(1) TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1) is applicable to the instant case. However, the trial court applied the

statute to the facts of the case in an incorrect manner. U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1) (a) provides a twostep inquiry. First, the trial court must determine whether "the circumstances of the child or one
or both custodians have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be
modified," or whether the joint custody order "has become unworkable or inappropriate under
existing circumstances." U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a). See Hogge v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51. 54 (Utah
1982) (stating that determination of whether substantial and material change of circumstances has
occurred is thefirststep in the change of custody analysis). Second, the trial court considers
whether a change in custody arrangements is in the best interest of the child. U.C.A. 30-310.4(l)(b). In the present case, the trial court incorrectly applied thefirststep of the analysis.
In determining whether a substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred,
the court should not consider changes in circumstances caused by the conduct of the noncustodial
parent now seeking custody. In Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P.2d 942, 948 (Utah App. 1988), the
court essentially held that changes in circumstances which were a consequence of the
noncustodial parent's conduct should not be considered by the trial court. The court concluded
that "Respondent [Mr. Fullmer] cannot use the circumstances he created to reopen the child
custody issue. To hold otherwise would provide incentive to noncustodial parents to create
havoc in the custodial parent's circumstances in order to justify reconsideration of the custody
award." Id at 948.
In the present case, the court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred,
8

namely, the joint parenting relationship had broken down. However, in applying U.C.A. 30-310.4(l)(a), the court failed to consider whether the change in circumstances had been caused by
the noncustodial parent, in this case the appellee. Under the rationale of Fullmer, the court should
not have considered changes in circumstances directly caused by the appellee's conduct. Here,
the breakdown in the joint custody relationship was a direct consequence of appellee's conduct in
initiating the "tug-of-war" custody battle. This case presents exactly the type of situation Fullmer
sought to proscribe: appellee created havoc in appellant's circumstances and the joint custodial
relationship in order to obtain reconsideration of the custody arrangement. By failing to
recognize the rule of law set forth in Fullmer, the trial court applied U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a)
incorrectly and considered the changes in circumstances wrought by appellee's conduct.
The same rationale applies to the language in U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a) directing the court
to inquire whether the joint custody order "has become unworkable or inappropriate under
existing circumstances." U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(l)(a) (Emphasis added). Following the Fullmer
rationale, the phrase "existing circumstances" should be construed to exclude changed
circumstances caused by the conduct of the noncustodial parent. In addition, it should be noted
that the trial court did not proceed under this line of inquiry; rather, the trial court found a
material change of circumstance. Thus, even assuming the joint custody order was unworkable
under existing circumstances, this court cannot rely on such assumption, because the trial court
did not make that finding for this court to review.
Finally, appellee attempts to distinguish Fullmer on its facts. First, appellee alleges that
Fullmer is distinguishable because in the present case appellant posed a threat to the children's
emotional and physical health. Appellee's assertion is ludicrous; the trial court made no such
9

finding. Next, appellee contends Fullmer is distinguishable because the cases are factually
different. In Fullmer, the custodial parent's circumstances changed because the noncustodial
parent sought modification of the child custody order on the night before the custodial parent was
scheduled to move to another state, thus forcing the custodial parent to hire an attorney and
hurriedly arrange temporary living accommodations and employment. In the present case,
circumstances changed when the joint custody co-parenting relationship was damaged by
appellee's initiation of the bitter custody dispute. The factual differences between the cases are of
no consequence and do not lessen the import of the rationale advanced by the Fullmer court.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILDREN ARE NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THIS APPEAL.

Appellee mistakenly argues that because appellant does not challenge the factual finding
that granting custody to appellee is in the children's best interests, the trial court's decision must
be affirmed. Appellee could not be more wrong. The trial court never should have reached the
issue of the children's best interests, because under a proper application of the law, the trial court
would not have progressed beyond the material and substantial change of circumstances inquiry.
In Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472, 475-76 (Utah App. 1991), the court held that "[o]nly
if a substantial change of circumstances is found should the trial court consider whether a change
of custody is appropriate given the child's best interests." See U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1); Hogge v.
Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982). See also Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 839 (Utah App.
1991) (affirming trial court's decision not to change a stipulated joint custody order, and finding
trial court properly based its refusal to change custody on the lack of a substantial change in
10

circumstances without reaching the issue of the best interests of the children).
Appellee contends that because the initial joint custody order arosefroma stipulation of
the parties, the children's best interests are dispositive. This courtflatlyrejected appellee's
argument in Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1992). In that case, the court noted
that Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), modified the Hogge test and liberalized the scope
of evidence allowed on the issue of changed circumstances to allow parties to introduce evidence
of a change's effect on a child's best interest. Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d at 596-97. The court
held, however, that the "fundamental burden to establish a material change of circumstances was
not diminished" merely because the challenged custody decree was based on default. Id at 597.
In other words, even though Elmer allows evidence of a child's best interests to be introduced,
the fundamental burden of establishing a substantial and material change of circumstances
remains. See Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d at 596-97; Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 621-22
(Utah App. 1991). Therefore, the trial court'sfindingregarding the children's best interests is not
dispositive of this appeal.
Moreover, it should be noted that the evidence regarding the children's best interests
related solely to the breakdown in the joint custody relationship, and did not independently
establish some other material change in circumstances. Even if the best interests evidence could
establish an alternative change in circumstances, a change not caused by appellee's conduct, the
trial court did not make any suchfindingfor this court to review.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND RECOGNIZE THAT THE
BREAKDOWN IN THE JOINT CUSTODIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS A RESULT OF
THE CUSTODY LITIGATION.
11

The trial court found a material change of circumstances occurred in March of 1995 when
the appellee remarried. Although the trial court established March 1995 as the time frame for
when some difficulties first arose, the trial court did not expressly find that appellee's remarriage
was the sole or even the primary cause of the joint parenting problems. It is important to
remember that appellee had lived with her new husband since 1992, and that therefore her 1995
remarriage did not create any substantive changes in visitation, living arrangements, or any other
relevant aspect of the joint parenting arrangement. Appellant contends that even assuming for the
sake of argument that the remarriage did play a minor part in the problems with the joint parenting
arrangement, the record clearly shows that the initiation and continuation of the custody litigation
played a more serious role and was the dominant cause of the joint parenting problems. The trial
court failed to acknowledge this crucial evidence and failed to recognize the effect the custody
litigation had on the joint custody relationship.
The record contains direct evidence, some in the form of appellant's testimony,
unequivocally showing that the breakdown in the joint custody relationship was caused and
facilitated by the commencement of the child custody litigation. However, appellee contends that
appellant's testimony cannot be considered because the trial court found his credibility lacking.
While the trial court did offer its belief that appellant had been "playing games" during the
pendency of the litigation, including during discovery, the trial court did not expressly find that
appellant was not a credible witness at trial. More importantly, the trial court did not find that
appellant's testimony regarding the cause of the joint parenting problems was not credible.
Contrary to appellee's assertion, the trial court's statement regarding appellant's pre-trial conduct
12

cannot be read as a blanket indictment of his credibility on the witness stand. Further, this court
cannot independently judge appellant's credibility. See Riche v. Riche. 784 p.2d 465, 467 (Utah
App. 1989). Appellee's contention lacks merit. Appellant's testimony concerning the detrimental
effect of the custody litigation is uncontro verted and should have been recognized by the trial
court.
VI.

APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS, AND AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY
FEES IS NOT WARRANTED.
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that if the court determines an

appeal isfrivolous,the court "shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs,
as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party." Rule 33(b)
defines afrivolousappeal as "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."
In Erickson v. Wasatch Manor. Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah App. 1990), the court
discussed the practice of penalizingfrivolousappeals:

"Sanctions forfrivolousappeals have only been applied in egregious cases, such as when
an appeal wasfiledin order to 'take unconscionable advantage' of the other party and
therefore fails to meet the standards of good faith. Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395, 398
(Utah Ct.App.1987). 'Egregious cases may include those obviously without merit, with
no reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the delay of a proper judgment.'
Maughan [v. Maughan]. 770 P.2d [156] at 162.... We have interpreted 'without merit'
to mean an appeal 'without a reasonable legal or factual basis.' O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d
306, 309 (Utah Ct.App.1987)."
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"The 'sanction' for bringing a frivolous appeal is applied only in egregious cases, 'lest
there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.' Porco v.
Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App.1988)." Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah
App. 1989). Moreover, "an unsuccessful appeal which has some merit is not frivolous. See
Hincklev v. Hincklev. 815 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (Utah App. 1991)." Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d
193, 199 (Utah App. 1992).
In the present case, appellant's appeal is soundly based upon and warranted by existing
law. Appellant has made good faith arguments regarding the interpretation and construction of
U.C.A. 30-3-10.4, has raised in good faith a viable legal argument regarding the Fullmer case, has
challenged the trial court's application of existing law to the facts of this case, and has argued that
the trial court failed to make a finding of fact, regarding the cause of the joint custody relationship
breakdown, in conformance with the evidence adduced at trial.. As the preceding arguments
demonstrate, this appeal clearly has a strong factual and legal basis. Appellee's request for
attorney fees is unwarranted and must be denied.
Appellee also claims attorney's fees should be awarded based on appellee's financial need.
"Attorney fees on appeal may be granted in the discretion of the court in conformance with
statute or rule. Management Services Corp. v. Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah
1980). Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-3 (1984) provides that either party to a divorce action may be
ordered to pay the adverse party to prosecute or defend the action. This includes attorney fees
incurred on appeal." Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989).
In the present case, both parties sought an award of attorney's fees at the trial court level.
The trial court, however, ordered each party to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. Because
14

the trial court did not award attorney's fees to appellee, she is not entitled to an award of
attorney's fees on appeal. In Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 727 (Utah App. 1994), the court
addressed a similar situation:

"Generally, when a trial court awards fees in a divorce action to a party who then prevails
on appeal, that party will also be entitled to fees on appeal. Crouse v. Grouse. 817 P.2d
836, 840 (Utah App. 1991). However, in the present case, the trial court did not award
attorney fees to either party in the action below. Therefore, regardless of which party
prevails on appeal, and absent any showing that the parties'financialsituation has changed
subsequent to the time of the trial court's decision, both parties must bear their own fees
on appeal. Cf. Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465, 470-71 (Utah App. 1989) (remanding to trial
court for determination of whetherfinancialcircumstances of party who was denied
attorney fees incurred at trial had changed such that an award of fees incurred on appeal
was appropriate)."

In the case at bar, appellee has not made any showing that the parties'financialsituation
has changed since the time of the trial court's decision. Accordingly, Larson dictates that appellee
must bear her own attorney fees on appeal.
In the alternative, this court may choose to remand the matter for a hearing to determine
"the need of the claiming spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, the reasonableness of the
fees and the amount, if any, to be paid." Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah
App. 1994). The Schaumberg court held that where new allegations of a change in financial
condition are not a matter of record and have not been adjudicated by afinderof fact, the
appellate court cannot evaluate that claim, and it may be remanded to the trial court for
determination. Id at 604. However, a remand is not required, because the decision to award
15

attorney's fees lies within the sound discretion of the appellate court.

CONCLUSION
Appellee's contentions are devoid of legal merit. First, the rule requiring marshaling of
the evidence has no application to this appeal, as appellant has not directly challenged the factual
findings made by the trial court. Second, U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(2), reasonably and properly
construed, is not applicable to the facts of this case. Third, contrary to appellee's contention, the
trial court'sfindingsregarding the best interests of the children are not dispositive of this appeal,
because the trial court never should have reached that step in the analysis.
The trial court erred by failing to recognize that the breakdown in the joint custodial
relationship was a result of the custody litigation initiated by appellee. As a result, the trial court
erred in its application of U.C.A. 30-3-10.4(1) to the facts of this case, because the trial court
should not have considered changes in circumstance unilaterally created by appellee in an attempt
to reopen the custody issue. Lastly, it is clear that this appeal is notfrivolous,and an award of
attorney fees is not warranted.
The trial court's decision should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2^* day of C^JJph^^
LEN R. ELDRIDGE
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